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█ Abstract This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ “Free Will” as well as 
key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes 
thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by criti-
cal points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free 
will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can be de-
fended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris. 
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█ Riassunto Una risposta libertaria a Dennett e Harris sul libero arbitrio – Questo articolo prende critica-
mente in esame gli argomenti principali presentati nel volume di Sam Harris “Free Will” e gli aspetti princi-
pali della concezione compatibilista proposta da Daniel Dennett sul libero arbitrio. Intendo sostenere che 
Dennett, pur rispondendo accuratamente alla critica del compatibilismo proposta da Harris, sostiene un 
compatibilismo che resta sotto il giogo delle critiche sollevate da Bruce Waller. Inoltre, cercherò di sostenere 
che il rifiuto della prospettiva libertaria proposto da Harris è una posizione male informata e illustrerò i 
principi di fondo della prospettiva libertaria di Robert Kane, affermando che la si può difendere dalle criti-
che sollevate sia da Dennett che da Harris. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Libero arbitrio; Libertarianismo; Compatibilismo; Daniel Dennett; Sam Harris 
 

SEVERAL YEARS AGO DANIEL DENNETT 
published an essay, Reflections on Free Will, 
which was an extended discussion of Sam 
Harris’ book, Free Will. Harris’ book offers 
an extended critique of the compatibilist 
conception of free will which Dennett en-
dorses as well as a critique of libertarian con-
ceptions of free will. While differing on the 
merits of compatibilism, Dennett and Harris 
both believe that libertarian views are deeply 
problematic. 
In what follows, I offer a defense of the 
libertarian perspective on free will by ad-
dressing key points raised in the works of 
both Dennett and Harris. I argue that while 
Dennett provides good replies to Harris’ cri-
tique of compatibilism, there are deeper prob-
lems with Dennett’s view which have been 
raised poignantly by Bruce Waller. Addition-
ally, I contend that the challenges to libertari-
an free will voiced by both Harris and Dennett 
are answerable and in doing so, I support a 
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libertarian view akin to that of Robert Kane. 
Early on in Sam Harris’ book, Free Will, 
he states: 
 
Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply 
not of our own making. Thoughts and in-
tentions emerge from background causes of 
which we are unaware and over which we 
exert no conscious control. We do not have 
the freedom we think we have. Free will is 
actually more than an illusion (or less), in 
that it cannot be made conceptually coher-
ent.  Either our wills are determined by pri-
or causes and we are not responsible for 
them, or they are the product of chance and 
we are not responsible for them.1 
 
Daniel Dennett and I both think this is a 
bad argument, but we do so for different rea-
sons which reflect our different perspectives 
on the nature of free will and moral responsi-
bility. As a compatibilist, Dennett attacks 
Harris’ assertion that «our wills are deter-
mined by prior causes and we are not respon-
sible for them». As a libertarian, I find Har-
ris’ assertion that if our wills are not deter-
mined «then they are the product of chance 
and we are not responsible for them» to be 
problematic. 
It is my view that to have the kind of free 
will which would make us morally responsi-
ble in such a way as to be deserving of praise 
and blame and reward and punishment we 
must engage in some causally undetermined 
free acts which enable us to be the ultimate 
authors of our characters and the actions 
which proceed from them. Dennett and Har-
ris, indeed most contemporary philosophers, 
reject such an approach. Nonetheless, in later 
stages of this essay I will try to take some 
strides in showing why such a libertarian 
view may be correct. Before doing so, howev-
er, I will turn my attention to Dennett’s re-
sponse to Harris. While I agree, with many of 
Dennett’s criticisms of Harris’ argumenta-
tion, I do feel that the compatibilist view he 
defends is problematic in significant respects. 
It is my hope that by revealing some of these 
deficiencies in Dennett’s approach I can pro-
vide some motivation for giving the libertari-
an view another and closer examination. 
Sam Harris discusses two psychopaths, Ste-
ven Hayes and Joshua Komisarjevsky, who 
committed horrible crimes. Reflecting on these 
psychopaths and their actions, he writes: 
 
As sickening as I find their behavior, I 
have to admit that if I were to trade places 
with one of these men, atom for atom, I 
would be him: There is no extra part of 
me that could decide to see the world dif-
ferently or to resist the impulse to victim-
ize other people.  Even if you believe that 
every human being harbors an immortal 
soul, the problem of responsibility re-
mains: I cannot take credit for the fact 
that I do not have the soul of a psycho-
path. If I had truly been in Komisarjev-
sky’s shoes on July 23, 2007 – that is, if I 
had his genes and life experience and an 
identical brain (or soul) in an identical 
state – I would have acted exactly as he 
did.  There is simply no intellectually re-
spectable position from which to deny 
this. The role of luck, therefore, appears 
decisive.2 
 
Harris is suggesting that had he been born 
into the world with exactly the same kind of 
nervous system and faced exactly the same 
environmental conditions as these two psy-
chopaths then Harris himself would have 
committed awful crimes. According to causal 
determinism, all future events, including hu-
man decisions and actions, are a necessary 
consequence of prior states and events and the 
laws of nature. Thus, given one’s starting 
points in life this makes all the difference to 
where one will end up and what one will do. 
And since one’s starting points are a matter of 
luck beyond one’s control, then what one ul-
timately does in later life is a matter of luck 
beyond one’s control. In this way Harris be-
lieves that free will is incompatible with a de-
terministic picture of the universe. This in 
turn helps explain his assertion that: 
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[A] neurological disorder appears to be 
just a special case of physical events giving 
rise to thoughts and actions. Understand-
ing the neurophysiology of the brain, 
therefore, would seem to be as exculpato-
ry as finding a tumor in it.3 
 
On Harris’ view, a deterministic universe 
is a universe in which the kind of free will 
which grounds just deserts responsibility 
does not and cannot exist.  
Dennett replies that these arguments are 
wrongheaded. He notes that while it’s true 
that our genetic heritage is a matter of luck 
and much of the environmental conditions we 
are exposed to as we mature into adults is a 
matter of luck, it does not follow from this 
that determinism precludes us from having 
the kind of free will that supports just deserts. 
 
Harris can’t take credit for the luck of his 
birth, his having had a normal moral edu-
cation – that’s just luck – but those borne 
thus lucky are informed that they have a 
duty or obligation to preserve their com-
petence, and grow it, and educate them-
selves, and Harris has responded admira-
bly to those incentives. He can take credit, 
not Ultimate credit, whatever that might 
be, but partial credit, for husbanding the 
resources he was endowed with.4 
 
According to Dennett, while it’s a matter 
of luck whether we are born with normal 
human brains and whether we are provided 
with a normal moral education, if we are 
born normal brained and given a normal 
moral education then we will rightly be held 
morally responsible for our actions and 
blamed and punished for our wrongdoing. 
The normal brained human being who is giv-
en a normal moral education will have the 
kind of rationality and self-control which jus-
tifies ascriptions of responsibility. The nor-
mal person, who is neither psychopathic nor 
suffering from other kinds of neurological or 
psychological disorders nor acting under du-
ress or threat, raised under normal condi-
tions is rightly held responsible for what she 
does. Such a person can understand the mor-
al norms and laws and the consequences for 
non-compliance and has the kind of self-
control to guide his or her conduct in accord-
ance with such understanding. According to 
Dennett, these rationality and self-control 
conditions for free morally responsible action 
can be met by the normal human being even 
if determinism is true. 
 
[W]e don’t hold everybody responsible; as 
[Harris] notes, we excuse those wo are un-
responsive to demands, or in whom change 
is impossible. That’s an important differ-
ence, and it is based on the different abili-
ties or competences that people have.  
Some people (are determined to) have the 
abilities that justify our holding them re-
sponsible, and some people (are deter-
mined to) lack those abilities. But deter-
minism doesn’t do any work here; in par-
ticular it doesn’t disqualify those we hold 
responsible from occupying that role.5 
 
In his essay Dennett defends at length this 
compatibilist conception of free and respon-
sible action against the criticisms made by 
Harris. As noted, I think he provides an ad-
mirable defense against these arguments. In 
what follows, I would like to test the merit of 
his views by considering points raised in re-
cent work by Bruce Waller.6 For Waller’s ar-
guments present a more serious challenge to 
Dennett’s position.7 
Waller believes we lack the kind of free will 
that makes us morally responsible in the basic 
desert sense. Because of this he thinks practices 
of blame and punishment are ethically indefen-
sible, as they perpetrate unjust harms upon 
others. In supporting his view, he subjects both 
libertarian and compatibilist conceptions of 
free will and responsibility to significant criti-
cisms. While I don’t find his case against liber-
tarianism to be all that compelling, I do find his 
case against compatibilism to be convincing. 
Waller contends that Dennett has «de-
veloped the most philosophically famous ver-
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sion of the plateau argument for moral re-
sponsibility».8 The plateau argument rests on 
ideas noted above which Dennett develops in 
response to Harris. The idea here is that once 
a person reaches a certain level of competence 
in terms of rationality and self-control she is 
rightly held morally responsible for her ac-
tions. The typical adult human being meets 
these conditions; those who don’t are the vic-
tims of especially deficient upbringings or 
mental disorders or act under duress or 
threat.9 As noted, Dennett thinks that for 
many of us it will be a matter of luck whether 
we meet the rationality and self-control condi-
tions for being a morally responsible person; 
however, all those who meet these conditions 
should be treated as equally responsible for 
their conduct. Thus, given two adults meeting 
the plateau conditions for moral responsibil-
ity, if they face the same choice and one acts 
badly while the other acts virtuously it is ap-
propriate to reward the latter and to blame or 
punish the former. 
Waller takes issue with this aspect of 
Dennett’s view. Waller, a moral responsibil-
ity abolitionist, writes: 
 
Plateau advocates of moral responsibility 
insist that there is a general level of moral 
responsibility, and beyond that level, the 
individual differences have no effect on 
moral responsibility.  Moral responsibility 
abolitionists reply that even very small 
differences in capacities invalidate claims 
and ascriptions of moral responsibility.10 
 
To support this point, Waller tells the story 
of Ann and Barbara, each of whom must make 
the choice of whether to enjoy a weekend at 
the beach or keep a promise to help a friend 
move. He has us suppose that they both meet 
Dennett’s conditions for the plateau of moral 
responsibility and he says that Ann makes the 
choice to go to the beach while Barbara delib-
erates longer and decides to keep her promise 
to help her friend. 
 
Why does Ann deliberate briefly and inef-
fectually (had she continued deliberating, 
as Barbara did, she would have remem-
bered the relevant facts Barbara brings to 
the equation and would have chosen and 
acted as Barbara did), while Barbara de-
liberates more thoroughly and effectively? 
Why – within a naturalistic scientific ex-
planatory system – does one deliberate 
well and the other poorly? Plateau advo-
cates of moral responsibility counsel that 
we need not look more closely: both Ann 
and Barbara have reached the plateau of 
moral responsibility, both are capable of 
deliberation and choice, and both are 
morally responsible for their choices. In 
contrast, moral responsibility abolitionists 
insist on seeking an explanation for why 
Ann and Barbara chose differently.11 
 
Waller goes on to suggest that on a natu-
ralistic world view we should expect there to 
be sufficient causal reasons why Ann deliber-
ated briefly and made the poor choice and 
Barbara didn’t. 
 
[G]iven a naturalistic framework and the 
character [Ann] has and the situation she 
was in, she could not have made the better 
choice that Barbara made. Those consid-
erations do not imply that it was not Ann’s 
own faulty choice, or that she should be 
deprived of all future opportunities to 
make choices, or that she is an incompe-
tent who should be excluded from our 
moral community, but it does mean that it 
is unfair to blame Ann for a choice she 
could not avoid making. In stark contrast 
stands the moral responsibility system, in 
which Ann has reached the plateau of 
competence, and therefore she is morally 
responsible: no questions asked, no inquir-
ies allowed.12 
 
Given the truth of the naturalistic 
worldview, Waller believes there are deter-
ministic causal reasons why Ann is the way 
she is and why she made the poor choice and 
why Barbara made the good choice. He agrees 
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with Dennett that they may both meet the ra-
tionality and self-control conditions which our 
society has set as the conditions for responsi-
ble agency, but he thinks it is fundamentally 
unfair to regard them as equally responsible 
and, thus, while the one deserves praise the 
other deserves blame and punishment. He 
thinks Dennett’s view gives an accurate de-
scription of how the moral responsibility sys-
tem works, but he doesn’t believe it accounts 
for the fairness of the system. It is because of 
the inherent unfairness of Dennett’s approach 
to understanding the nature of free will and 
moral responsibility that Waller rejects it. 
Dennett is familiar with Waller’s criti-
cism. In a detailed review of Waller’s Against 
Moral Responsibility,13 he responds to it. 
Dennett argues that the societal rule which 
holds that those who meet certain minimal 
levels of rationality and self-control shall be 
held equally moral responsible for their ac-
tions is fair, because (1) having such rules is 
essential to the maintenance of a civilized so-
ciety and (2) we contract into living in such a 
civilized society due to the benefits it offers. 
 
You don’t have to play the moral responsi-
bility game; you can be a hermit on an oth-
erwise deserted island, fishing and forag-
ing. But if you want to enjoy the benefits of 
living in a civilized society, you have to 
play the game.14 
 
Dennett goes on to contend that to ade-
quately refute him Waller must present a plau-
sible way of maintaining a civilized society 
without the moral responsibility system that 
Dennett endorses.  He acknowledges that Wal-
ler provides an account of this, but he contends 
that it is utterly deficient. 
Waller tries describing a society in which 
people would not be blamed and punished for 
their errors and crimes, but Dennett says the 
no-blame system he describes could plausibly 
work only if there were some harsh, punitive 
consequences for those who continually engage 
in wrongdoing and are not receptive to nonpu-
nitive measures.  
The no-blame system only works against a 
background of blame and the omnipresent 
threat of punishment, the suspenders that 
hold up the pants.15 
 
In a response to Dennett’s review, Waller 
acknowledges that he has not provided a fully 
worked out alternative to the moral responsi-
bility system, but he still contends that the 
moral responsibility system should be abol-
ished as it is not fair enough. It is not fair 
enough, because there is no rational alterna-
tive for us than to opt into this system which 
treats all minimally rational and self-
controlled adults as equally responsible even 
though on a deterministic naturalistic under-
standing of the world this is clearly not the 
case. He reminds us how Dennett says the 
moral responsibility system is fair enough be-
cause we choose to play “the moral responsi-
bility game.” Waller states: 
 
But here the sports/game metaphor be-
comes less helpful. If I don’t like football 
and its rules, I can play a new game… But in 
life we can’t select another game, or choose 
a different social system: this is the only one 
available, unless we decide to be hermits. 
For profoundly social animals, that’s not an 
attractive option – especially when those 
who remain in the game would classify us as 
demented, and fit only for treatment, and 
unworthy of respect or affection. If we don’t 
play we are banished not just from society, 
but from the human community.16 
 
Waller’s response to Dennett is funda-
mentally sound. While Waller admits that he 
has not fully worked out a no-blame system 
to replace the moral responsibility system, he 
has still shown that Dennett cannot explain 
why the moral responsibility system is fair 
enough. The problem with Dennett’s ap-
proach is that he’s a compatibilist who thinks 
that even if all events, including human ac-
tions and decisions, are causally determined 
by prior states and events, then we can still 
rightly be held morally responsible for our 
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actions. On Dennett’s view, even if determin-
ism is true then we can rightly be held re-
sponsible in acting if we meet his rationality 
and self-control requirements. But, as Waller 
shows quite forcefully, with his examples of 
Ann and Barbara, once we accept a natural-
istic deterministic perspective we should also 
believe there are sufficient causal conditions 
which are beyond Ann’s control which have 
led her to be the way she is and which explain 
why she could not have made the better 
choice which Barbara made.  Barbara and Ann 
meet Dennett’s requirements for morally re-
sponsible agency, but once we accept a deter-
ministic worldview we must also concede that 
Ann has come to be who she is through factors 
beyond her control and because of who she is 
she makes the poor choice she makes.  In this 
way, a deterministic worldview really does 
undermine the belief that people are morally 
responsible for what they do, and as such it 
undermines the belief that the moral respon-
sibility system is fair. 
Additionally, Dennett’s retort that the 
system is fair since we opt into it is misguided 
for precisely the reasons Waller gives – it is 
“an offer one can’t refuse”, as Don Corleone 
would say. Opting out of the moral responsi-
bility system to live as an isolated hermit is 
not a decision we can expect any reasonable 
person to make. Thus, the fact that we par-
ticipate in the moral responsibility game is no 
sign of its fairness. Now Dennett might say, 
 
But, still, the benefit we get from the mor-
al responsibility system is a civilized socie-
ty. By having a system that allows for pun-
ishment of those that don’t conform to 
the rules which protect rights to life, liber-
ty, and property, we all stand to benefit.  
 
In this way, Dennett may feel that his 
compatibilist model of moral responsibility is 
justified. However, while Waller would have 
to concede that there are some benefits to the 
moral responsibility system, it is still a system 
that is unfair in significant respects and we 
should continue to search for a workable al-
ternative to it which rejects the notion that 
people can be morally responsible in such a 
way as to deserve blame and punishment. 
I would note that the driving force of Wal-
ler’s critique of Dennett’s view is his spelling 
out of the implications of determinism. He 
shows how it is that on the deterministic 
model two people who meet Dennett’s com-
patibilist conditions of responsibility will still 
be shaped to be as they are by factors beyond 
their control and this will in turn shape the 
way they respond to situations they face. In 
this way, we are led to see that it is a matter of 
constitutive luck that when faced with the 
same choices Ann makes a poor choice and 
Barbara makes a good choice. We might won-
der here whether the belief in determinism is 
true and we might also wonder whether inde-
terminism of the right sort in human decision-
making could help us make sense of morally 
responsible agency. 
Now, both Dennett and Harris believe that 
indeterminism in human behavior and deci-
sion-making will offer no help in supporting a 
belief in free will and moral responsibility; in-
deed, as I note above, most philosophers (in-
cluding Waller) believe such a libertarian ap-
proach will not help matters. Notice how Har-
ris says in a passage I quoted earlier: 
 
Either our wills are determined by prior 
causes and we are not responsible for 
them, or they are the product of chance 
and we are not responsible for them.17  
 
The presumption here is that if our actions 
or decisions are not determined then they 
would be chance happenings – matters of luck 
– not reflective of our free will and thus not 
acts or decisions for which we could be moral-
ly responsible. 
Both Dennett and Harris reject the liber-
tarian idea that indeterminacy in human de-
cision-making could help in making the case 
for free will and moral responsibility. In what 
follows I will examine their criticisms of such 
libertarian approaches to free will and re-
spond to them. 
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█ Harris’ argument considered  
 
Harris’ critique of the libertarian ap-
proach has two prongs to it. First, as noted, 
he thinks the indeterminacy involved in lib-
ertarian accounts of free will suffer from a 
problem of control robbing luck. Second, he 
thinks the view is scientifically indefensible. 
Regarding the latter he states: 
 
Today the only philosophically respectable 
way to endorse free will is to be a compati-
bilist – because we know that determinism, 
in every sense relevant to human behavior, 
is true.  Unconscious neural events deter-
mine our thoughts and actions – and are 
themselves determined by prior causes of 
which we are subjectively unaware.18 
 
He goes on to note how some thinkers be-
lieve the occurrence of quantum level inde-
terminacy in brain functioning could allow 
for causally undetermined free actions, not-
ing that biologist Martin Heisenberg holds 
such a view. However, Harris responds: 
 
Quantum effects are unlikely to be biologi-
cally salient in any case […] [F]ew neurosci-
entists view the brain as a quantum com-
puter.  And even if it were, quantum inde-
terminacy does nothing to make the con-
cept of free will scientifically intelligible.19 
  
Clearly Harris believes that neuroscience 
tells us that our decision-making is causally 
determined, and, furthermore, even if some 
of our decisions were causally undetermined 
it wouldn’t help matters any. This latter 
point reflects his belief that undetermined 
decisions would essentially be random hap-
penings unreflective of our free will. In fur-
ther support of this point, he states: 
 
If my decision to have a second cup of cof-
fee this morning was due to a random re-
lease of neurotransmitters, how could the 
indeterminacy of the initiating event count 
as the free exercise of my will? Chance oc-
currences are by definition ones for which I 
can claim no responsibility. And if certain of 
my behaviors are truly the result of chance, 
they should be surprising even to me. How 
would neurological ambushes of this kind 
make me free? Imagine what your life 
would be like if all your actions, intentions, 
beliefs, and desires were randomly “self-
generated” in this way. You would scarcely 
seem to have a mind at all. You would live 
as one blown about by an internal wind.20 
    
Now, what are we to make of all of this? 
Harris finds it scientifically implausible to 
think that any or our decisions could be caus-
ally undetermined. But do we really know this 
to be true? And why does Harris think this is 
true? In support of this he cites the empirical 
findings of Benjamin Libet21 and other neuro-
scientists. Harris says he starts each day drink-
ing either coffee or tea. He says he had coffee 
today, but he says this choice could not have 
been consciously made, because,  
 
the intention to do one thing and not an-
other does not originate in consciousness 
– rather, it appears in consciousness, as 
does any thought or impulse that might 
oppose it.22  
 
It is in supporting this point that he in-
vokes the experiments of Benjamin Libet and 
others, which he believes to have shown that 
with respect to all of our decision-making 
there are always unconscious neural processes 
occurring prior to our conscious actions and 
decisions which determine them. 
The problem with Harris’s argument here is 
that the experimental data from Libet and oth-
ers have been significantly challenged in the 
philosophical literature. In Alfred Mele’s Free 
Will and Luck,23 Ch. 2, he clearly demonstrates 
that Libet’s experiments do not in fact show 
that all of our actions are causally determined 
by unconscious neural activity. Libet’s findings 
are also criticized in Ch. 4 of Mark Balaguer’s 
Free Will As An Open Scientific Problem.24 Since 
Harris appeals to the Libet experiments in 
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making his case for the claim that all of our ac-
tions are causally determined by unconscious 
neural activity, he really should have included 
some response to the thoughtful criticisms of 
this line of argument which have been made by 
Mele and Balaguer.   
As noted, Harris also cites other, more re-
cent empirical research which is in line with 
the research of Libet. For instance, he cites 
the work of Haynes, Fried, Mukamel, and 
Kreiman, Haggard.25 In more recent writings, 
Mele has developed arguments which sug-
gests these experimental findings also fail to 
show that all of our actions are determined 
by unconscious neural activity. For instance, 
he grants for the sake of argument that Libet 
and these others may well have shown that in 
the experiments they’ve performed the ex-
perimental subjects did engage in decision-
making caused by unconscious neural activi-
ty.26 However, it does not follow from these 
very limited findings that all human deci-
sion-making is caused by unconscious neural 
activity. In the experiments performed, sub-
jects make trivial, morally neutral decisions 
in a short frame of time. In these cases, it was 
learned that neural activity leading up to ac-
tion occurred before the agents were con-
sciously aware of intending to act, suggesting 
that the decision to act occurs before one is 
consciously aware of it. Harris takes such ex-
perimental findings to suggest that all of our 
decisions are causally determined by uncon-
scious neural processes. But, Mele  notes that 
the experimental conditions in which these 
subjects act does not warrant such a universal 
claim about all human decision-making. He 
notes that we often make difficult moral de-
cisions after consciously considering which 
option is best over an extended period of 
time. Given the significant difference in the 
nature and duration of such deliberation, we 
have reason to doubt the claim that all hu-
man decision making is causally determined 
by unconscious neural processes. He goes on 
to note there are also some experimental 
findings which suggest that our conscious 
mental processes do play a role in our deci-
sion-making, citing work on the effects of 
“implementation intentions”.27 
For the reasons cited above, we have good 
reason to believe that Harris’ argument for 
the view that all human decisions are causally 
determined by unconscious neural activity is 
inadequate. However, it still might be 
thought that Harris is correct in maintaining 
that causal indeterminacy in decision-
making wouldn’t help matters any. It might 
be thought that he is correct when he says 
that causally undetermined decisions are 
chance events and not the sorts of events for 
which we can be morally responsible. In re-
sponding to this other prong of Harris’ case 
against the libertarian view, it should be not-
ed that Harris’ discussion of the issues is too 
brief.  He seems unaware of the various re-
sources that are available to libertarian phi-
losophers in dealing with this criticism.  Be-
fore concluding that this problem of chance 
or luck is decisive he should have given some 
consideration to the various ways in which 
libertarians, such as Mark Balaguer, Laura 
Ekstrom, Robert Kane, and Timothy 
O’Connor among others,28 have addressed 
this problem. In what follows, I will develop a 
response to this criticism of libertarianism 
using key ideas and arguments from Robert 
Kane. Much of my own work on free will has 
focused on Kane’s approach, and while my 
own views differ from his in some respects, it 
is safe to say that I find his approach to be 
correct in its essentials.29 
Kane’s libertarian view acknowledges that 
most of the free willed acts we perform and 
for which we are morally responsible are 
causally determined by our character, by the 
kinds of persons we are. On his view, such 
causally determined actions can have a deriv-
ative freedom and we can be morally respon-
sible for them insofar as we have shaped our 
character through prior causally undeter-
mined free actions, which he calls “self-
forming actions” (SFAs). So, for instance, I 
am walking down the street and I see a wom-
an unknowingly drop her purse and without 
thinking about it I pick it up and give it back 
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to her.  This action is most likely determined 
by my character, the kind of person I am. At 
this point in my life, I am the kind of person 
who is just the sort to do this kind of thing. 
But, on the Kanean view I can be said to act 
freely in returning this woman’s purse and I 
can be morally responsible for doing so, inso-
far as I have in the past shaped my character 
by engaging in causally undetermined free 
acts – SFAs – that have contributed to my 
being the kind of person I am now. Notice 
already that we see one problem with Har-
ris’s conception of the libertarian view. Earli-
er I noted how he says,  
 
Imagine what your life would be like if all 
your actions, intentions, beliefs, and de-
sires were randomly “self-generated” in 
this way. You would scarcely seem to have 
a mind at all. You would live as one blown 
about by an internal wind.30  
 
Here, in talking about the libertarian con-
ception of freedom, he has us imagine what 
our lives would be like if all of our actions 
were causally undetermined. But as we can 
see the libertarian need not believe that all 
human decisions need to be causally unde-
termined in order for us to make sense of free 
will and moral responsibility. Kane, as well as 
other libertarians, need not hold that all of 
the free willed acts for which we are respon-
sible are causally undetermined. 
Nonetheless, Kane does believe that when 
we are causally determined to act as we do we 
are free in such action and morally responsible 
for it only to the extent that we have shaped the 
character from which these acts flow from pri-
or causally undetermined free acts, the SFAs. 
To be more precise, Kane believes that we can 
only be ultimately free and responsible for acts 
causally determined by our character when 
those acts flow from a character formed by 
some prior SFAs and in addition when those 
causally determined acts that flow from a char-
acter so formed also meet certain kinds of 
compatibilist criteria of free and responsible 
action. That is, in performing them the agent 
must: (i) be reasons responsive; (ii) possess tel-
eological guidance control over his action; (iii) 
be uncoerced; (iv) not be controlled or manipu-
lated by other agents; and (v) act intentionally 
and not accidentally nor by mistake. The char-
acter-forming SFAs themselves must also satis-
fy these criteria as well as being causally unde-
termined and plural voluntary. Harris’ primary 
concern is how we can be responsible for such 
SFAs if they are causally undetermined. His 
thinking is that if they are causally undeter-
mined then they are mere chance occurrences, 
matters of luck, for which we cannot be morally 
responsible. Thus, they cannot be the basis for 
our moral responsibility when our acts are 
causally determined by our character.   
This argument is at the heart of Harris’s ob-
jection to libertarianism, but it is based on con-
fusion. Using certain points originally made by 
J.L. Austin,31 Kane shows that the mere fact 
that an action is causally undetermined does 
not mean that it is an utterly random happen-
ing for which we have no moral responsibility. 
Imagine that an assassin tries to shoot and kill 
the President, and imagine that it is causally 
undetermined whether he will have a nervous 
twitch as he pulls the trigger, leading him to 
miss his target. Suppose that despite this inde-
terminacy in the process of firing his rifle, he 
succeeds in killing the President. If so, he will 
have succeeded in what he was trying to do 
and, thus, he will be responsible for killing him. 
Even if a jury knew the fact that he might have 
twitched and instead missed the President, they 
would not regard him as any less responsible 
for his action. Kane gives other similar sorts of 
examples which clearly demonstrate how one 
can be morally responsible for causally unde-
termined actions.   
Admittedly, there is a difference between 
the case of our assassin and someone who 
makes a causally undetermined decision. The 
assassin’s mind was made up when he at-
tempted to kill the President. In the case of 
the assassin, the causal indeterminacy rests in 
whether or not he will have a nervous twitch 
in his arm as he pulls the trigger. A critic, 
such as Harris, may feel that if the indeter-
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minacy lies in the decision-making process of 
an agent, then there may nonetheless be a re-
sponsibility undermining luck involved that 
is not present in the case of the assassin. 
Kane addresses this worry in his writings. 
He argues that when we engage in causally 
undetermined SFAs we are torn between do-
ing two or more things which we would like 
to do and which we feel we have good reason 
to do. This leads us to deliberate about what 
it is best to do, and such deliberation ends 
when me make a choice to do one thing or 
the other. He often uses the example of an 
ambitious businesswoman on her way to an 
important business meeting. On her way, she 
sees an assault taking place in alley. She 
wants very much to make it to her business 
meeting, but she also feels obligated to stop 
and help prevent this assault. Consequently, 
she deliberates about what she should do. 
Kane hypothesizes that in these sorts of situ-
ations when we deliberate we are actually en-
gaged in efforts to do each of the things we 
want to do. So, on Kane’s view in her process 
of deliberating the woman is trying to go on 
to her business meeting and she is trying to 
stop and prevent the assault. The signifi-
cance of this is that even if her decision is 
causally undetermined she will be morally re-
sponsible for her choice either way, since 
whichever choice she ends up making it will 
be a result of her own effort – a result of 
what she was trying to do. Thus, as the assas-
sin was responsible for his causally undeter-
mined killing of the President because it was 
what he was trying to do, so too persons en-
gaged in causally undetermined SFAs will be 
responsible for their decisions either way. 
Kane argues that this conception of caus-
ally undetermined libertarian free choice 
need not involve any appeal to mysterious 
theories of dualism, agent-causality, or nou-
menal selves.  Rather, as he argues there are 
ways of accounting for such free causally un-
determined decisions in naturalistic terms. 
He suggests that in SFAs our conflicting ef-
forts might be carried out in recurrent neural 
networks in the brain which can influence 
each other. Relating this to the example of 
the businesswoman, he states: 
 
The input of one of these neural networks 
consists in the woman’s reasons for acting 
morally and stopping to help the victim; 
the input of the other network comprises 
her ambitious motives for going on to her 
meeting. The two networks are connected 
so that the indeterminism that is an ob-
stacle to her making one of the choices is 
present because of her simultaneous con-
flicting desire to make the other choice – 
the indeterminism thus arising from a 
tension – creating conflict in the will […] 
This conflict […] would be reflected in 
appropriate regions of the brain by 
movement away from thermodynamic 
equilibrium. The result would be a stir-
ring up of chaos in the neural networks 
involved.  Chaos in physical systems is a 
phenomenon in which very small changes 
in initial conditions are magnified so that 
they lead to large and unpredictable 
changes in the subsequent behavior of the 
system […] [S]ome scientists have suggest-
ed that a combination of chaos and quan-
tum physics might provide the genuine in-
determinism one needs. If the processing 
of the brain does ‘make chaos in order to 
make sense of the world’ (as one recent re-
search paper puts it), then the resulting 
chaos might magnify quantum indetermi-
nacies in the firings of individual neurons 
so that they would have large-scale inde-
terministic effects on the activity of neural 
networks of the brain as a whole.32 
 
Here Kane is suggesting some way in 
which we might scientifically understand 
how such causally undetermined SFAs could 
occur, as opposed to appealing to the myste-
rious theories of dualism, agent-causation, or 
noumenal selves, as various libertarians have 
done in the past.  More recently, in The Ox-
ford Handbook of Free Will,33 Kane has em-
phasized a point made by philosopher of sci-
ence, Robert Bishop. Bishop points out that 
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one need not even have to appeal only to 
chaos to get these effects. For, as he notes, 
 
the exquisite sensitivity needed for both the 
sensitive dependence arguments and the 
normal amplification of quantum effects is 
a general feature of nonlinear dynamics and 
is present whenever nonlinear effects are 
likely to make significant contributions to 
the dynamics of the system.34  
 
This is significant because it is generally 
agreed that nonlinear dynamics is a pervasive 
feature of the functioning of human brains.35 
Kane is not saying that this is exactly what is 
going on in our brains when we make the kinds 
of difficult decisions like that of the business-
woman. He would acknowledge that his views 
on this are speculative, while asserting that they 
are in the realm of possibility. His point is that 
if we have the kind of free will that makes us 
morally responsible, then some of our actions 
must be causally undetermined. His theory of 
SFAs and the dual efforts involved in them is 
intended to show that such a view is coherent, 
and his discussion of recurrent neural networks 
and the magnification of quantum indetermi-
nacies is intended to show how this theory 
might fit with a modern scientific world view. 
Kane is a naturalist, and he believes that we will 
not really know whether we have libertarian 
free will until we learn more about the brain 
and how it operates. 
Admittedly, this view has been subject to a 
lot of criticism in the philosophical literature. 
As noted, much of my own philosophical 
writing has focused on these criticisms; and, 
while I have found some of them to be apt, I 
have found many of them to be answerable. I 
should note as well that Kane is not the only 
philosopher to give a naturalistic account of 
libertarian free will.  For others, see the work 
of Balaguer, Ekstrom, and Mele.36 Regarding 
Mele’s work on the subject, I would note that 
he is not committed to a libertarian view, but 
he has worked out a version of libertarianism 
which he regards as plausible and coherent. 
Harris’ rejection of the libertarian approach 
to understanding free will and moral responsi-
bility is overly brief.  It overlooks the resources 
open to those who are sympathetic to such an 
approach. Were he to make a convincing case 
for rejecting such an approach, he would need 
to engage the kinds of issues I raise here and 
engage the abundant literature in which these 
ideas and arguments have been made. Since he 
doesn’t do so, there is no reason for an in-
formed philosopher to take his critiques of the 
libertarian approach seriously. 
 
█  Dennett’s argument considered  
 
Dennett, on the other hand, has presented 
more serious challenges to the libertarian 
theory of free will. He is well-versed in the 
literature on free will, and he understands 
that to refute the libertarian view one must 
delve more deeply into the arguments made 
for the view. In his classic Freedom Evolves,37 
he devotes a full 42 pages to the exposition 
and critique of Kane’s libertarian view.  In 
what follows, I will address two of the central 
criticisms he makes against Kane’s view. 
The first criticism I want to consider is 
Dennett’s own version of the luck problem. 
In Freedom Evolves, Dennett argues that if 
the decisions that establish our free will are 
the products of quantum level indeterminacy 
which occurs in some of our decisions, then 
why shouldn’t we say that such decisions are 
free willed when the indeterminacy of our 
decisions is generated from a source external 
to our brains? He has us imagine that when 
engaged in difficult decisions the indetermi-
nacy doesn’t occur in your brain. 
 
Suppose the indeterministic neurons in 
your faculty of practical reasoning died, 
leaving you disabled for any future SFAs. 
But suppose, fortunately for you, that the 
damaged part of your brain could be re-
placed by an indeterministic prosthetic de-
vice implanted in just the right milieu in 
the healthy part of your brain. A good way 
to get genuine quantum indeterminism in-
to a physical device is to use a little bit of 
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decaying radium and a Geiger counter, but 
it might not be healthy to have such a radi-
um randomizer implanted in your brain, so 
it could be left in the lab, surrounded by a 
lead shield, and its results could be fed into 
your brain on demand, by a radio link […] 
The location of the randomizer in the lab 
obviously shouldn’t make a difference, 
since it is functionally inside the system; it 
would play exactly the same role as the 
damaged neurons used to play, no matter 
where it was geographically.38 
 
Dennett knows we would be uncomforta-
ble saying choices dictated by external ran-
dom processes are free willed.  His point is 
that there is no difference between having 
these as the source of the indeterminacy or 
having the indeterminacy result from quan-
tum indeterminacy in neural functioning.  
Thus, we should be skeptical of Kane’s view. 
He notes that in correspondence Kane 
has said,  
 
the indeterminacy-producing mechanism 
must be responsive to the dynamics with-
in the agent’s own will and not override 
them or it would be making the decisions 
and not the agent.  
 
Dennett sees Kane as suggesting here that 
an external source of randomness would 
threaten the agent’s autonomy, the agent’s abil-
ity to make decisions for himself. Thus, on 
Kane’s view it would seem the causal indeter-
minacy must have its source in brain function-
ing where it can be responsive to the will of the 
agent. 
In response to this Dennett writes,  
 
wouldn’t it be much safer – and hence more 
responsible – to keep the randomizer inside 
you, under your watchful eye in some sense?  
No. Randomness is just randomness.39  
 
The point seems to be that wherever the 
causal indeterminacy is situated randomness 
is just randomness. So, wherever you place it 
– whether inside the neurons of your brain or 
in an external randomizer – we should be 
concerned about whether such causally unde-
termined behavior is free willed behavior for 
which we can be responsible. 
Dennett’s critique here focuses too much 
on randomness. On Kane’s view, free willed 
decisions are causally undetermined but they 
are not random. Think of our businesswom-
an.  Whichever act she does whether (A) pre-
venting the assault or (B) going to her busi-
ness meeting, it will be caused by her effort to 
A if she does A or by her effort to B if she 
does B. Whichever act she does, it will be 
caused, but causally undetermined, by her 
effort. As such, what she does will not be a 
random happening but a product of her ef-
fort either way; and, as I’ve argued earlier, 
she will be responsible either way. 
Furthermore, technically, it does not nec-
essarily matter if one uses a prosthetic device 
external to one’s brain that allows one to 
make the relevant causally undetermined de-
cisions. As long as the device is, as Kane 
notes, «responsive to the dynamics within 
the agent’s own will» such that it is respon-
sive to the competing efforts of the agent and 
her reasoning in all the ways that her normal 
functioning brain would be, then an agent 
using such a device would still not make ran-
dom decisions. Rather, such an agent would 
make causally undetermined decisions for 
which she’d be responsible, since either way 
her decisions would be reflective of her will. 
The second criticism which I want to con-
sider runs deeper. Dennett argues that if 
Kane’s view were true, then we would not ev-
er have any way of knowing whether a per-
son was morally responsible for his actions. 
For on Kane’s view to be morally responsible 
one must have engaged in some causally un-
determined SFAs. But, as Dennett notes, for 
an act to be an SFA it will have to be a deci-
sion resulting from magnification of quan-
tum level indeterminism occurring in the 
neurons of the brain.  
 
The price libertarians pay for sequester-
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ing their pivotal moments in subatomic 
transactions in some privileged place in 
the brain (at time t) is that they render 
these all-important pivots undetectable by 
both the everyday biographer and the ful-
ly equipped cognitive neuroscientist.40 
 
According to Dennett, on Kane’s view 
neither the common man on the street nor 
fully trained cognitive scientists would ever 
be able to discern whether a person is morally 
responsible, because we could never tell 
whether a person has engaged in the causally 
undetermined SFAs which are supposed to 
make us responsible. 
Dennett says that in correspondence Kane 
has replied that any theory of free will shall be 
faced with difficulties in determining which 
persons meet the conditions of moral responsi-
bility.  Thus, according to Kane, this shouldn’t 
count as good reason to reject his view.  In re-
sponse to this, Dennett says Kane’s view does 
nonetheless have difficulties on this front that 
other views don’t have, and this can justify a 
rejection of Kane’s view.41 
In support of this criticism, Dennett has 
us consider that we have 100 murderers.  
Suppose that 60 of them had either bad life 
experiences and upbringings or neurological 
problems that give us good reason to believe 
they are not responsible for their crimes. Al-
so, imagine that 10 of them are borderline; 
there are some problems in their life situa-
tions or their neurology which lead us to 
wonder whether they had enough self-
control and understanding to be morally re-
sponsible for their crimes. Finally, suppose 
that the remaining 30 had healthy nervous 
systems and «normal-to-exemplary upbring-
ings».42 According to Dennett, what we 
should want from our conception of free will 
and moral responsibility is a concept that will 
help us determine who among these murder-
ers deserves punishment and who does not. 
He claims that Kane’s view will not help. For 
even to determine whether any of the 30 
normal brained and normally raised murder-
ers are responsible we would have to know 
whether they have engaged in causally unde-
termined SFAs which made them the mur-




Why should the metaphysical feature of 
Ultimate Responsibility […] count more 
than the macroscopic features that can be 
defined independently of the issue of 
quantum indeterminism, and that are well 
motivated in terms of the decision-
making competences that agents have or 
lack? Indeed, why should metaphysical 
Ultimate Responsibility count for any-
thing at all? If it can’t be motivated as a 
grounds for treating people differently, 
why should anyone think it a variety of 
free will worth wanting?44 
 
Dennett’s view is that Kane’s conception 
of free will provides us with a free will not 
worth wanting because it will be useless in 
distinguishing between those who are re-
sponsible and deserving of punishment and 
those who are not. Kane has said in his de-
fense that any theory of free will runs into 
problems making such distinctions, but Den-
nett’s point is that other theories, such as his 
own compatibilist view, will only have this 
problem when dealing with the 10 marginal 
cases among our 100 murderers, whereas 
Kane’s view won’t even allow us to determine 
the responsibility of the 30 normal brained 
murderers with normal upbringings. 
There is something to Dennett’s argu-
ment here. On the Kanean view we won’t be 
able to know who is ultimately responsible 
and who is not. Kane himself admits that we 
don’t know whether we engage in causally 
undetermined decisions which are to serve as 
the ground for our free will and morally re-
sponsibility. Additionally, it must be conced-
ed that if it is correct, a compatibilist view, 
such as Dennett’s, has the advantage that it 
would enable us to know who is responsible 
and who is not. For we can verify which per-
sons have the kind of self-control and rea-
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sons responsiveness to understand the moral 
norms and conform to them.  
However, compatibilist views, like Den-
nett’s, have this advantage only if they are cor-
rect. As I argued earlier, using key arguments 
from Bruce Waller, such compatibilist views 
are problematic. The examples of Ann and 
Barbara make it clear that just because two 
persons facing the same decisions and who 
both meet Dennett’s competency conditions 
for responsibility might not both be responsi-
ble for their different choices. For if determin-
ism is true then there will be sufficient causal 
conditions for all events, meaning there will be 
conditions external to these agents which ex-
plain why the one makes the poor choice and 
the other makes the good choice. This makes 
it clear why it is unfair to blame the one for 
her poor choice, as her poor choice will be a 
matter of constitutive luck. Compatibilist 
views invariably run into this problem of con-
stitutive luck and because of this they cannot 
give an account of blame and punishment up-
on which such practices are fair. 
As a consequence of this, libertarian views 
and theories of free will denial (either hard de-
terminism or hard incompatibilism) are the 
only two credible options. Furthermore, as 
noted, we cannot at this point provide suffi-
cient metaphysical or empirical evidence for 
the existence of libertarian free will. And this 
in turn means that from the theoretical point 
of view we cannot know if anyone is morally 
responsible for what they do.  So, what is to be 
done? Should we who find the libertarian view 
to be a coherent and plausible view but who 
cannot give theoretical proof of its existence 
refuse to believe in its existence and give up on 
the practices of blame and punishment? 
Should we, like Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caru-
so, Bruce Waller45 and other moral responsi-
bility deniers, abstain from believing that we 
have the kind of free will that grounds judg-
ments of desert? In the end, I don’t think we 
should. While there is not at this point suffi-
cient empirical or metaphysical evidence of 
the existence of free will, there are still moral 
and pragmatic reasons for living and acting as 
if we do have free will. The belief in free will is 
too important for moral notions like that of 
desert, and notions of desert are too im-
portant to our sense of self-worth and human 
dignity. We should continue to search for the 
metaphysical and empirical evidence of liber-
tarian free will, while at the same time devel-
oping the moral and pragmatic arguments for 
living and acting as though we have this kind 
of free will. If the moral/pragmatic argument 
is sound, then the libertarian could justify 
holding the 30 normal brained murderers with 
normal upbringings responsible for their 
crimes. For presumably, assuming the Kanean 
view is correct, then normal human beings will 
have engaged in enough of these causally un-
determined SFAs to make them responsible 
for their actions. 
These concluding remarks are, I know, 
too brief and sketchy. This is especially the 
case insofar as contemporary deniers of mor-
al responsibility, such as Pereboom, Caruso, 
and Waller, have done so much to argue that 
we would be morally and practically better 
off by rejecting the belief in moral responsi-
bility and the concomitant notion of just de-
serts. But, I don’t believe their rosy picture of 
a world without belief in free will and moral 
responsibility will hold up under scrutiny. So, 
I will end here having noted that the libertar-
ian view is a coherent, plausible view; and 
while we cannot know that such free will ex-
ists, we should continue to defend its coher-
ence and possible existence while also devel-
oping the moral/pragmatic grounds for liv-
ing and acting as if it were true. 
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